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Abstract. Using a panel of 18 European OECD countries over the period 1979-2011, this 
paper re-examines and extends previous empirical evidence on the effects of minority 
government on fiscal policy outcomes. First government primary balance is separated into 
revenues and expenditure according to Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999). Second minority 
governments are categorized into dummy variables according to Edin and Ohlsson (1991). 
Evidence show that political fragmentation appears to be more significant in times of 
economic crises, and that minority government affect government primary balance, revenues 
and expenditure negatively.  Surplus coalition government affect the government primary 
negatively in the 2000s, as opposed to single minority government. These results suggest that 
due to the complex and ambiguous nature of minority government, it cannot be directly 
translated into number of parties in ruling coalition.  
Keywords: minority government, government primary balance, expenditure, revenue, political 
fragmentation. 
1. Introduction 
   Many OECD countries have accumulated large debts and budget deficits in the last 40 
years. Since then the economic politics discipline has attempted to explain the reason behind 
government spending choices.   
   According to the European Commission, 11 countries broke the Maastricht Treaty criteria 
of a general government deficit exceeding 3 % of GDP and 16 countries broke the criteria of  
a gross general debt exceeding 60 % of GDP in 2013. At the same time debt and deficit levels 
vary substantially between these countries. The general consensus is that the variation cannot 
be explained only by economic variables, but that the differences lie in the structure of 
government institutions. Researchers have found evidence that political fragmentation may 
lead to larger budget deficits and that the relationship is especially significant in times of 
economic stress. Given the last decade’s severe global economic crises and the high number 
of indebted countries in the world today, this is a very important and current issue that calls 
for more attention and more research.  
   The purpose of this paper is to deepen and extend previous literature on the relationship 
between political fragmentation and fiscal policy outcomes. More precisely the purpose is to 
examine the relationship between minority government and government primary budget, 
revenues and expenditure. The relationship is examined in two main ways: by examining new 
data from the last decade and by using a new combination of economic and political variables. 
The analysis consists of a regression on panel data for 18 European OECD countries over the 
period 1979-2011. The dependent variable is separated into government primary balance, 
expenditure and revenues in the manner of Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999). The political 
variable is chosen in the manner of Edin and Ohlsson (1991) where the type of government is 
categorized into dummy variables. The goal with this combination of variables is to get as 
quantitative and objective results as possible. 
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   The next section presents previous research. Section 3 describes the theoretical 
underpinning of the regression model. Section 4 examines the data set. Section 5 describes the 
estimated empirical regression and the expected outcome. Section 6 presents the basic results 
and section 7 describes several robustness tests on the basic result regression. Section 8 
concludes the results.  
2. Previous research 
   This section presents previous research on the subject. First differences and similarities 
between the studies are described. Then the present study is demonstrated and compared to 
previous studies. 
Table 1 presents previous research with time- and country samples, dependent and political 
variable. Roubini and Sachs (1989) were one of the first to define the political and economic 
determinants of budget deficit. They discovered that many parties in ruling coalition as well 
as short average tenure of government tend to lead to larger budget deficit. Edin and Ohlsson 
replicated this research in 1991 and found that minority governments rather than majority 
coalition governments appear to run large budget deficits. However, De Haan and Sturm 
(1994) did not find any relationship between the form of government and budget deficit. 
Borelli and Royed (1995) argued that the impact of structural differences on budget deficit is 
more significant in times of economic stress. Depending on the type of economic shock, 
coalition size and cabinet size have different impact on expenditure and budget deficit 
according to Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999). Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) found that 
one-party majority government and multi party governments must rely on different budgetary 
institutions in order to reduce budget deficits.  
  All previous researchers run regression models on panel data where the economic and 
political variables are separated for. The economic variables are in general always including 
the deficit/debt/expenditure, percent of real GDP as the dependent variable, and the real GDP 
growth rate and the change in the unemployment rate as independent variables. The main 
difference lies in the use and choice of political variables. Naturally many problems arise 
when political variables are tested for empirically since they are subject to a country’s 
political, cultural and institutional history among others. Previous researchers have chosen as 
their political variables everything from size fragmentation, effective number of parties in 
parliament, political complexion of government, indexes of political cohesion, right wing-left 
wing dominance in parliament to political elections among others. Thus there are many 
different ways to measure political variables and often not easy to do so in an objective 
manner.  
  This paper follows the investigation of Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999). However it extends 
their study in some profound ways. First, this study examines 16 years of new data. Second, 
by examining the actual classification of government, i.e. the type of government, political 
fragmentation is measured in a more precise and appropriate manner. It is difficult to relate 
results to the institutional structure of government when just talking about number of parties 
in ruling coalition. Third, in contrast to Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) the type of 
5 
 
 
 
government is categorized into dummy variables which remove eventual bias due to 
subjective opinions about government weakness or strength.  
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3. Theory 
   This section describes the underlying theory of how political fragmentation may lead to 
larger budget deficits. First the definition and nature of minority government is presented. 
Second the theory behind analysing for government primary balance, revenue and 
expenditure, is explained. Finally the theoretical background for including an interaction 
variable and a second political variable is described.  
   The theory of how political fragmentation may lead to larger budget deficits is well 
established and used in practically all texts concerning the subject. On a very general level it 
says that the larger the number of political parties in a ruling coalition, the harder it is to reach 
budget decisions, since each party will conduct lobbying on its own interest
1
. The purpose of 
this study is to examine minority governments, therefore the number of parties in ruling 
coalition is not given any attention. Due to the same reason the relationship between electoral 
systems and budget deficit is not treated
2
.    
   3.1.1 The nature of minority government  
   The reason for examining minority governments is that it may reflect political fragmentation 
in another way than the number of parties in ruling coalition according to Kontopoulos and 
Perotti (1999). The definition of a minority government is that the governing parties does not 
possess majority of overall seats in parliament. A minority government is therefore forced to 
seek support among other parties in parliament which are not in government. This might lead 
to extensive inconsistency in government policy since a minority government may have to 
accommodate with one party on one concern and another party on a different concern. Each 
party who participate in the majority then demands a share in the budget. As a result 
expenditure and budget deficit increase.  
   Note however that minority governments may have different effects on government primary 
balance, revenue and expenditure depending on the number of parties in the minority coalition 
and how far from a majority they are. As mentioned, single minority governments depend on 
the support of other parties. Most of the time they are however multi-party governments. The 
difference between multi-party coalition governments and minority governments is therefore 
rarely clear cut (Edin and Olsson, 199). Indirect this also says that a minority government, 
which has extensive support from parties outside government, is in reality less fragmented 
than it appears to be. Additionally the definition of minority government says nothing about 
the extent or the degree of minority that exist in parliament. If for example, minority 
government affect budget deficit when the governing party (ies) has only 25% of the seats, all 
of the governing party (ies) that has between 26-49% of the seats are not significant in the 
regression and does not affect budget deficit. With this in mind, we know that the minority 
                                                          
1
 See Roubini and Sachs (1989) de Haan and Sturm (1994), Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999), Hallerberg and von Hagen 
(1999), for a survey of this theory.  
2
 The general consensus is that proportional representation systems lead to multi-party systems and coalition governments, 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999), Persson and Svensson (1989), Roubini and Sachs (1989), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), 
Alesina and Perotti,(1995) Davidsson (2007) among others.  
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dummy is not necessarily directly translated into more political fragmentation in the manner 
of more number of parties in ruling coalition like Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999).  
   3.1.2 Government primary balance, revenues and expenditure   
   As for the dependent variable, the government primary balance is divided into expenditures 
and revenues. Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) are alone in emphasizing the importance of 
looking at expenditure rather than the deficit. The theory says that as the number of decision 
makers increase, the marginal cost of expenditure to each decision maker falls. At the same 
time, every decision maker will demand a higher expenditure as each decision maker has its 
own interests to bear in mind. As a result, expenditure will increase. Kontopoulos and Perotti 
(1999) highlight the importance of looking at expenditure as opposed to deficit since they 
argue that political fragmentation might not be captured in the deficit alone. By definition, 
expenditure that exceeds revenues leads to budget deficit. Furthermore it is the budget deficit 
that is of interest in current economic politics and one might argue that the most common and 
direct way to examine the fiscal policy environment is to look at the deficit. However the 
findings of Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) stress the importance of examining the exogenous 
forces behind budget outcomes.  
   3.1.3 Defining an interaction variable  
  Previous studies have found evidence that political fragmentation is especially bad for fiscal 
policy outcomes in times of economic stress
3
. Roubini and Sachs (1989) argue that coalition 
governments may prolong budget deficits in times of adverse shocks which require spending 
cuts. This is because coalition members have specific spending choices and veto powers 
against change over the budget
4
. To test this theory an interactive term between real GDP 
growth rate and the minority dummy is included in the regression model. This will change the 
interpretation of real GDP growth rate and the minority dummy when they are separated. If 
the interaction term did not exist, the coefficient of the minority dummy would be interpreted 
as the effect of minority government on the dependent variable. However the interaction term 
indicate that the effect of minority government on the dependent variable is different for 
different values of the real GDP growth rate. Therefore the unique effect of minority 
government is not limited to the coefficient of real GDP growth rate, but also depends on the 
values of the coefficient of the interaction term and real GDP growth rate. Now the coefficient 
the minority dummy is the unique effect of minority government, only when real GDP growth 
equals zero.  
   Finally there is evidence that expenditure tend to increase in times before political elections. 
Theory of the Political Budget Cycle theory says that pre-electoral manipulation among 
politicians in government increases their chance of being re-elected (Drazen and Eslava, 
2005, Palda and Palda, 1998, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004). Therefore an additional 
political variable is added for political elections.  
 
                                                          
3
 See Roubini and Sachs (1989), Borelli and Royed (1995), Kontopulos and Perotti (1999) among others. 
4
 See Roubini and Sachs (1989).  
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4. Data 
   In this section the data is presented and discussed. Initially the sample of countries and the 
sample period is explained. Second the dependent variable is described, followed by the 
political variables and finally the macroeconomic variables. 
   The data comprise 18 European countries over the period 1979-2011
5
. The goal with the 
choice of data is to have a lot of variation in the dependent variable and the minority 
government dummy variable, and little variation in the other independent variables. To 
achieve this, the analysis only includes countries within the OECD-Europe group defined by 
the OECD Economic Outlook. The background variables are expected to work at the same 
level for all observations with this choice of countries. The OECD-countries in Europe not 
included are the following countries formally controlled by the Soviet Union: Estonia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The reason for the exclusion is that these countries 
were strongly influenced by communistic economic politics until the 1990s. Turkey is also 
excluded due to its transcontinental nature. As mentioned earlier, this study extends the results 
of Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) by examining new data from the time period of 1996 to 
2011. This study examines the three last decades which have experienced a lot of fiscal action 
and economic stress to test the theory of the importance of political fragmentation in times of 
economic stress. 
   Like most previous research, this analysis separates macroeconomic and political variables. 
All data come from the OECD Economic Outlook and the Comparative Political Data Set I 
(Armingeon et.al. 2013), which contained the least amount of gaps compared to all other 
databases. Furthermore, the data was cross-checked (for the years available) with the 
EUROSTAT’s National Income Accounts, the UNdata Set and the International Financial 
Statistics, to gain as much comparability as possible of the data.  
   4.1.1 Government finance variables  
   The first variable defined is the government primary balance, measured as a percentage of 
GDP.  The government primary balance excludes interest payments on public debt 
6
 and is the 
closing entry in either the capital or financial accounts according to OECD (2014). By 
definition it shows whether a country is a net borrower or a net lender. As stated earlier, this 
study separates for government primary balance, expenditure and revenue. General 
government revenue includes taxes on production, the net value of capital transfers and the 
net value of purchases of non-financial assets. General government expenditure includes all 
general government expenditure
7
.  
   Here there is a gap in data which concerns Switzerland and Luxembourg from 1979 to 1989. 
The definition of government primary balance forms one of the two Maastricht excessive 
                                                          
5
 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.  
6
 A budget in balance has expenditure equal to revenue, but has a deficit due to interest payments on debts in the 
past.  
7
 According to OECD National Accounts (2014) it includes all public and individual consumption, excluding 
consumption part of the gross fixed capital formation. 
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deficit criteria which are used by the European Commission. The comparability of the data is 
especially good for EU countries. Since different types of institutions are included in each 
country’s respective institutional sectors, there is however always a problem concerning the 
comparability with cross country data (OECD National Accounts, 2014). Government 
primary balance, revenue and expenditure are named together named Y in the regression 
model.  
   Furthermore one can criticize the measurement of the government primary balance variable. 
Borrelli and Royed (1995) as well as Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) argue that the estimated 
impact of GDP change on deficit change might be distorted when using some form of GDP on 
both sides of an equation, since GDP growth in itself is able to decrease deficit measured as 
percentage of GDP even if the deficit remains the same. A solution to this problem is to use 
percentage change in the government primary balance variable as supposed to just percentage 
of GDP. This will be controlled for further on in the sensitivity analysis. 
   4.1.2 Political variables 
   The data used for the political variables is brought from the Comparative Political Data Set I 
(Armingeon et.al. 2013) and was double checked with its original source from the Party                 
Government Data Sets (Woldendorp et.al. 2013). The data was also compared to the 
European Journal of Political Research and the annual volumes of the Europa Yearbook. A 
type of government classification, or index, is available in this data set which defines six 
different types of governments. These are; “1 = Single Party Government: one party takes all 
government seats; 2 = Minimal Winning Coalition: all participating parties are necessary to 
form the government; 3 = Surplus Coalition: this comprises those coalition governments, 
which exceed the minimal-winning criterion; 4 = Single Party Minority Government: the 
party in government does not possess a majority in Parliament; 5 = Multi Party Minority 
Government: the parties in government do not possess a majority in Parliament; 6 = Caretaker 
Government: the government formed is not intended to undertake any kind of serious policy-
making, but is only minding the shop temporarily”, (Armingeon et.al.2013). Since this 
analysis has a straightforward measurement of political fragmentation, i.e. minority 
government, a political dummy variable was created which equals one for single party 
minority government and multi party minority government, and zero otherwise. A dummy 
variable was also created for year of election which equal one if election was (were held) the 
previous year and zero otherwise. This categorization can control for fragmentation without 
the problems of subjective opinions about the strength or weakness of a typical type of 
government
8
. The minority dummy is from now on called MIN.  
   Data for an election held the previous year is also collected from the Comparative Political 
Data Set I (Armingeon et.al. 2013) and a dummy was created which equal one if an election 
was held the previous year, zero otherwise. This dummy is called ELEC.  
    
                                                          
8
 In contrast to Roubini and Sachs whom value the budget effect of a minority government as three times as large as a two 
party majority coalition (Edin and Olsson, 1991) 
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   4.1.2 Economic variables 
Finally three macroeconomic variables are defined. First is the rate of growth of real GDP, 
named DY, which is a straightforward measurement of the relative change in real GDP from 
the previous year divided with the value of GDP from the previous year. Second is the 
inflation rate, which is named INFL. It is measured as the growth of consumer price index 
(CPI), percent change from previous year. Third is the unemployment rate as the percentage 
change of the civilian labour force
9
. In contrast to the unemployment level which is the 
number of people who are not working but are actively looking for work, the rate of 
unemployment is measured as a percentage of civilian labour force. This variable is now 
named DU.  
   All variables are cyclically unadjusted (Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999). One could argue 
that cyclically adjusted variables are desired when testing the effects of political factors, 
considering how previous studies have shown that political fragmentation is of statistical 
significance in times of economic stress. Furthermore general government data is used as in 
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999). Volkerink and de Haan (2001)  and Borelli and Royed 
(1995) argue that central government data is preferred over general government data because 
proportions of the total government taxing and spending policies are controlled by subnational 
authorities. However since this is a replication study of Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) which 
aims at re-examining and extending previous results, cyclically unadjusted variables are used 
for a direct comparison and general government data is used for as much comparability and 
consistency in data as possible. 
5. Method  
   This section will present the method for estimating the above described model.                       
The following panel fixed-effects regression is specified in the same manner as Kontopoulos 
and Perotti (1999):  
Yti  = α0   +   α1DYti  +   α2MINti +  α3DYt*MINti  +  α4 INFLti +  α5DUti   +  α6ELECti  +  Zi + ε       
   Where Yti is the dependent variable that in different specifications are either the government 
primary balance or the revenue or expenditure; DYti is the rate of growth of real GDP; MINti 
is a dummy variable equal to one for minority governments, zero otherwise; MIN*DYti is an 
interaction of minority governments with the rate of growth of real GDP;  INFLti is the 
growth of CPI, percent change from previous year; DUti is the unemployment rate as a 
percentage of civilian labour force, ELECti is a dummy variable equal to one if election(s) 
was (were) held the previous year, zero otherwise and Zi is a vector of fixed effect variables.  
   The null hypothesis for this analysis tests that α2 < 0, α3 > 0 when the dependent variable is 
government primary balance or the revenue. The analysis thus test that minority government 
affect the government primary balance negatively and that minority government is typically 
bad in times of economic stress. Considering the theory described earlier we know that the 
                                                          
9
 The unemployment as a percentage of civilian labour force is converted into percentage change for more consistency in 
data.  
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minority dummy is not necessarily directly translated into more political fragmentation. 
However we expect the null hypothesis for expenditure to be the opposite of that for 
government primary balance and revenue. The null hypothesis for expenditure thus tests that 
α2 > 0, α3 < 0. 
   According to section 3, an election held the previous year affects the government primary 
balance and revenues negatively. Therefore the null hypothesis tests that α6 < 0 when the 
dependent variable is the government primary balance or the revenue, and the opposite when 
the dependent variable is expenditure.  
   As for the macro economic variables, the null hypothesis tests that α1 > 0, α4 < 0 and α5 < 0 
when the dependent variable is government primary balance or revenue, and α1 < 0, α4 > 0 
and α5 > 0 when the dependent variable is expenditure. The signs of the coefficients are quite 
natural and the reason for including them is that they reflect the economic environment on 
government primary balance and expenditure (Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999). Real GDP 
growth increases the property income of households which in turns increase tax revenues. By 
definition inflation reduces the real value of accumulated debt and deficit. Finally high 
unemployment leads to high expenditure through unemployment compensation, insurance and 
subsidies.  
6. Results from benchmark regression 
   This section will describe the results from the total time period with the pooled regression 
model and the fixed effect-model
10
. First, I will focus on how to interpret the effects of 
minority governments in the presence of an interaction term. Second, I present the results 
from the pooled regression model. Third, I present the results from the fixed effects model 
with country and time fixed effects, respectively, and finally with both country and time fixed 
effects together.For each model, there are three regressions, one with primary government 
balance as dependent variable, one with government expenditure as dependent variable and 
one with government revenue as dependent variable. The results are presented in the same 
manners as Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999). 
   Initially, the interaction term requires some interpretation. If there were no interaction term, 
α2 would be interpreted as the effect of minority government on the dependent variable. 
However the interaction term indicates that the effect of minority government on the 
dependent variable is different for different values of the real GDP growth rate. At a zero real 
GDP growth rate, the results in column 1 in table 6.2 suggest that a country with a minority 
government decreases expenditure with approximately 1.41 percentage points. The interaction 
term suggests though, that this effect increases with 0.56 percentage points of GDP if real 
GDP growth rate is negative with one percentage point. The results support previous evidence 
                                                          
10
 The redundant fixed effects test rejects the null hypothesis of both redundant time-and country fixed effects. 
Furthermore a dummy variable for each country was created in the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) 
regression, where one obtain the same coefficients for all variables specified in equation (1) as with the fixed 
effect model. Additionally, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of all country dummies being equal to zero. 
Thus, the alternative hypothesis of fixed effect is appropriate 
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that political fragmentation in the form of minority government is more important in bad than 
in good times.  
   Table 6.1 presents the pooled regression which estimates the model without concern of 
cross section and time series nature of data. The individual effect that exists between the 
various countries and over time is therefore neglected. Note that this model is being included 
for comparison with the main fixed effects model. Just as Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) 
demonstrated, it is of importance to separate between government primary balance, revenue 
and expenditure. As shown in table 6.1, MINti is clearly significant and of the unexpected sign 
(according to the null hypothesis) for the revenue and expenditure regression. Furthermore 
DY*MINti is of the unexpected sign and significant in the expenditure regression. The 
macroeconomic variables are of the expected signs and significant with a few exceptions. 
ELECti is of the expected sign although far from being significant.  
   Since this is a panel data model which is estimated without accounting for the individual 
effects that exists between countries, the results are not of much significance. For example it 
is possible that there have been a greater amount of minority governments in countries with 
low expenditures than in countries with high expenditures.  
   Table 6.2 presents the results with fixed effects. One could argue that it seems natural to use 
country- fixed effect, since it allows for individuality and for different relationships between 
the dependent and independent variables for different countries. This is because the regression 
comprises political variables (Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999), which are clearly difficult to 
observe, since they are characterized by culture, tradition, social and political institutions 
among other things. Column one to three presents the results with country fixed effect. Now 
MINti is of the expected sign and significant in the government primary balance –and revenue 
regression. DY*MINti is of the expected (unexpected) sign and significant in the government 
primary balance (expenditure) regression. Furthermore the economic variables are of 
statistical significance and working as one would expect.  
  In columns four to six the results from the time fixed effect model is presented. Kontopoulos 
and Perotti (1999) argue that the reason behind the importance of time fixed effect is the 
probability of strong correlation between macroeconomic shocks and fiscal outcomes. This 
seems realistic since macroeconomic shocks are reflected in the economic variables DYti, 
INFLti, and DUti which are included in the model. MINti is significant in the revenue –and 
expenditure model, and still of the unexpected signs. DY*MINti is of the unexpected sign and 
significant in the expenditure regression. The economic variables are significant and of the 
expected signs. Important is that this model does not account for the individual effects that 
occur across countries. The results are therefore not of much importance.  
14 
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   The last three columns present the results with both country and time fixed effect. MINti is 
everywhere significant and of the expected (unexpected) sign in the government primary 
balance –and revenue (expenditure) regression. DY*MINti is of the expected (unexpected) 
sign in the government primary balance (expenditure) regression. Except for the INFLti (DYti) 
in the government primary balance (expenditure) regression with point estimate close to zero, 
all the economic variables are significant and working according to the null hypothesis.       
The ELECti is of the expected sign throughout the benchmark regression although never 
significant.  
   These are the basic results from the benchmark regression. In general the macroeconomic 
variables are working as expected. MINti and DY*MINti are also as expected in the 
government primary balance –and revenue regression, but not in the expenditure regression.  
   Still, the results that are of importance according to the previous discussion are the ones in 
with country fixed effect and both time and country fixed effect. When the expenditure 
regression yields unexpected signs of the coefficients of the minority dummy and the 
interaction term, the same coefficients of the revenue regression yields the expected sign, ie 
the same sign as in the expenditure regression, but with a higher point estimate. Thus the 
results are naturally connected, since the difference between the government primary balance 
and expenditure is the revenue. This says that minority governments affect both revenue and 
expenditure negatively, but since the negative effect is more extensive for revenue than for 
expenditure, the net effect is that it affects revenue more negative relative to expenditure. 
Thus the net result, ie the government primary balance, is also negative.  
   This initial test reflects the importance of estimating the model with especially country-
fixed effects and just like Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) all regressions will be controlled for 
both time and country fixed effect from here on after. Also, since most of the action is 
concentrated to the government primary balance and expenditure, the results from the revenue 
regression are not given any more attention from on.  
   7. Controlling for robustness 
   In the following five sections the results from the benchmark regression is controlled for in 
an extensive sensitivity analysis. First the total time period is separated into three decades. 
Second I control for possible outliers. Third, I perform two sensitivity tests for the dependent 
variable. Fourth, I examine for different type of minority government. Finally I control for the 
robustness of difficult times.  
   7.1.1 Controlling for decades  
This section controls for the three decades within the total time period. The decade with the 
most significant results are presented first.  
   Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) showed that it is central to distinguish between the three 
decades within the total time period due to each decade’s unique economic environment. 
Table 7.1 presents the results for each decade, and as one can see, most of the action is 
concentrated to the 2000s. MINti and DY*MINti remains highly significant in especially the 
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government primary balance-and expenditure regression. The coefficient of MINti  in the 
expenditure regression estimates to about a fifth of MINti in the government primary 
regression, while  DY*MINti estimates to about a fourth. The macroeconomic variables are 
working as expected and ELECti is not of statistical significance.  
   In the 1980s MINti loses its statistical significance in the expenditure regression compared to 
the 2000s. The point estimate of MINti is about 0.35percentage points less for the government 
primary regression than in the 2000s.  Neither MINti nor DY*MINti are of statistical 
significance in the revenue regression. The coefficients of the macroeconomic variables are in 
general just marginally different from zero and not statistically significant. ELECti is still 
statistically insignificant.  
   The 1990s contains the least amount of action regarding MINti and DY*MINti . Only MINti 
is significant in the expenditure regression. Only MINti is significant in the expenditure 
regression. Mainly the same results apply to the macroeconomic variables and ELECti as in 
the 1980s.  
   The difference between the 1990s and the 2000s is remarkable. As Kontopoulos and Perotti 
(1999) argued, the difference may be explained by the different nature of fiscal economic 
shocks in the two decades. The last decade has been characterized by unstable growth and a 
lot of fiscal action, mainly due to the global financial crises in 2007. With respect to the 
currency crisis in Asia, the European Exchange Rate mechanism crisis, and  the financial 
crisis in Russia, the crisis in the 1990s were more sequential and not affecting the global 
economy as direct and sudden as the crises in the 1980s and 2000s. The1980s was also 
distinguished by severe bank failures after the two oil shocks in the seventies and extensive 
changes in the regulatory and legislative fiscal environment. In line with the theory described 
in section 3, one would expect minority governments to have significant effect during the 
2000s and the 1980s, since these shocks require considerable cooperation to engage in fiscal 
consolidation.  
   This test confirms the importance of separating between the decades within the total time 
period. Since most of the significance appear on the 2000s and the 1980s the following 
sensitivity analysis will focus on these two decades.  
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   7.1.2 Controlling for outliers 
   This section controls for possible outliers. Once again I present the results in the same 
manner as Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999). First I describe the results from the government 
primary balance regression result and later the results from the expenditure regression. 
   To avoid naïve interpretations of the coefficients at this point, it is essential to control for 
outliers. In order to do so, one can remove one country at a time from all regression 
estimations (Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999). At this moment the time period of the 2000s is 
of interest, considering the results from the analysis in section. The results from the 1980s are 
also of some interest, since the interactive term is significance at the ten percent level. The 
results are presented in table 7.1 where the maximum p-values of the coefficients MINt and 
DYt*MINt are shown together with the point estimate and the corresponding country.  
  In the government primary balance regression, none of the individual countries affect the 
coefficients and their significance separately in a profound manner. Initially when looking at 
column two the exclusion of Ireland causes the interactive term to lose its statistical 
significance with a p-value of 0.31. In all other exclusions the interactive term remains 
significant at the ten percent level with a point estimate of 0.32-0.68. Moving on to the time 
period of 2000-2011, when excluding Norway the coefficient of MINti  loses its statistical 
significance with a p-value of 0.17, in contrast to all of the other countries whose exclusion 
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leaves the coefficient of MINti significant at either the one or five percent level. When Greece 
is excluded, the interactive term loses its statistical significance with a p-value of 0.11. The 
interactive term only loses its statistical significance when Greece is excluded. Thus, the 
coefficient of MINti and the interactive term does not appear to be sensitive to the inclusion of 
individual countries.  
   It is worth to mention that the government primary balance was relatively high (low) in 
Norway (Greece) compared to all other countries during this time except for Ireland in 2010 
when the government primary balance was negative at a point of 28.25 percent of GDP. 
Furthermore, Norway had minority governments in parliament during the first half of the 
decade, and minimal winning coalition in the second half. Greece had single party majority 
government during the entire time period. In the matter of Greece, this result supports the 
evidence that minority government is more significant in bad rather than in good times. 
   Similarly in the expenditure regression, none of the exclusions in the 1980s causes the 
interaction term to lose its statistical significance. The point estimate lies between 0.25-0.31 
and is significant at the three percent level. In the 2000s the exclusion of Spain causes the 
MINti to lose its statistical significance with a p-value of 0.37. In all other exclusions the 
MINti and the interactive term remains significant at the one percent level with a point 
estimate of -0.35 to -0.44 and 0.10-0.12 respectively.  
   Note however that one can argue whether France and Portugal should be included or not 
since they are semi presidentially regimes compared to all other countries which are different 
types of parliamentary regimes. The variable MINti could be more difficult to define in a 
precise manner for these countries. In the case of the expenditure regression, recall that data is 
missing to some extent regarding the time period from 1979-1989, which could question the 
result concerning the interactive term in the first decade. 
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   7.1.3 Controlling for the dependent variable 
   This section controls for the results by choosing two different compositions of the dependent 
variable. Once again I present the results like Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999). 
   Recall from section 4 the shortcoming in the construction of the fiscal variable. In table 4.1 
and 4.2 two alternative definitions of the dependent variable are presented. Just like before the 
time period of the 1980s and the 2000s are examined, where most of the significant results are 
located. 
 
   The first alternative definition of the fiscal variable is shown in column two and four in 
table 7.3a and 7.3b, respectively. Here the dependent variable is in levels and on the right-
hand side of the equation; the lagged value of the dependent variable is controlled for. 
Naturally the fixed effects of the model are now excluded since the combination of lagged 
variables and country-fixed effects produces incompatible estimates. Furthermore this test 
removes nearly all signs of autocorrelation
11
. Since the data contains very few gaps, the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent value is very close to one. Mainly this test confirms the 
robustness of DY*MINti in the government primary balance regression and MINti in the 
expenditure regression for both decades. The point estimates of DY*MINti  is about 0.10 
                                                          
11
 There has been some signs of autocorrelaton in…. 
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percentage points less than those from the benchmark regression. This difference is even 
greater for the point estimates of MINti which is about 0.25-0.40 percentage points less than in 
the benchmark regression. For the first time ELEC is significant and of the unexpected sign in 
column two. 
 
   The second alternative definition of the fiscal variable is shown in column one and three in 
table 7.3a and 7.3b. As mentioned, it is important to control for the percentage change rather 
than just percentage of real GDP in the dependent variable. This is because changes in GDP 
growth alone are able to change deficit measured as percentage of GDP even when the deficit 
remains unchanged. In general the basic results remain unchanged compared to the regression 
in table 7.1. DY*MINti remains highly significant, the only exception being in the primary 
government regression where it is now significant only at the ten percent level in the 2000s. 
The point estimates are also very similar to those in table 7.1. MINti remains significant in the 
government primary regression, although with point estimates of 0.20-0.30 percentage points 
less than in table 7.1. The same applies to the expenditure regression where MINti loses its 
statistical significance in the 1980s.  
   Overall this test confirms the robustness of the benchmark results and the results are 
especially strong for the government primary balance and the interaction variable.   
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7.1.4 Controlling for type of government  
   In this section I control for the type of government by separating for two different types of 
minority governments. I also create a new set of dummies for each type of government. The 
government primary balance results are discussed first, followed by the results from the 
expenditure regression.  
   The limitation with the variable MINt is that it does separate between different types of 
minority governments. That is, if the variable is significant as soon as one party in 
government does not possess majority in parliament, or if the significance appear later on, 
when more than one party in government do not possess majority in parliament. To control 
for this, three dummy variables were created for the government type index. The first one is 
equal to one for single party minority, zero otherwise. The second dummy variable is equal to 
one if multy party minority, zero otherwise and the third dummy variable is equal to one if 
majority government, zero otherwise. The three new dummy variables are named SINt,  MULt 
and MAJt respectively. The results are presented in table 7.3.  
   As shown in table 7.3, only SINt was of statistical significance in the 1980s. In the 2000s 
MULt and MAJt were of the right sign and of statistical significance. The same results apply 
to the 1980s concerning the expenditure regression. However in the 2000s SINt and MAJt 
were of the right sign and of statistical significance. To further control for the statement of 
Edin and Ohlsson (1991) that the difference between multi-party coalition governments and 
minority governments is often hard to define, a dummy was created for each type of 
government except for the caretaker government type. Only the dummy for the surplus 
coalition (minimal winning coalition) was negative (positive) and of statistical significance in 
the 2000s for the government primary balance regression. Thus the argument could be applied 
for the government primary balance during the last decade only.  
  Very important to note here is that the interpretation of the caretaker government is not clear 
since it is just a temporally solution in times of severe political crisis. Also, this test separates 
between single and multi minority governments, but it still does not say anything about how 
many parties that is significant in contrast to a single party.  
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   7.1.5 Controlling for difficult times 
  In this final section I control for robustness concerning the relationship between political 
factors in times of economic stress.  
Recall from the benchmark regression in section 6.1 that the interaction term suggested that 
the minority dummy was more important in bad than in good times. Like Kontopoulos and 
Perotti (1999) this result will now be tested for by using a measure from the OECD Economic 
Outlook named the GDP gap which measures the deviation of actual GDP from potential 
GDP as a percent of potential GDP. The results are presented in table 7.4.  
  In the1980s the interaction term loses its statistical significance in both the government 
primary balance and the expenditure regression. In the 2000s it has a point estimate of 0.40 
suggesting that the negative effect of minority government on government primary balance 
increase with 0.40 percentage points of GDP if real GDP growth rate is negative with one 
percentage point. In the expenditure regression the interaction term is marginally negative 
with a point estimate of 0.05. 
   Note that extensive gap in data in the 1980s causes the number of observations to fall 
drastically.  
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   8 Conclusion 
   The goal of this paper was to extend the study of Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) and to 
examine for new data from the last decade. The variable of political fragmentation differed 
from Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999). Instead of separating for number of parties in ruling 
coalition and number of spending ministers, the type of government was categorized into 
dummy variables in the manner of Edin and Ohlsson (1991).  
   The main results from this study show evidence of a relationship between minority 
government, expenditure and revenues. As one would expect, this relationship is negative for 
the government primary balance and revenue. More surprisingly it is also negative between 
minority government and expenditure. This might seem unrealistic at a first glance, but 
appears logical when the results from each regression are connected. The negative 
relationship is stronger for revenue than for expenditure. In words it says that minority 
governments affect both revenue and expenditure negatively, but that the effect is stronger for 
revenue than for expenditure. Naturally this results in a negative government primary balance.  
   The results from the sensitivity tests show that minority government has a strong and robust 
effect on especially government primary balance regression and expenditure and that the 
relationship is strong for the last decade and the 1980s. The robustness of the interaction 
variable is also confirmed in the last decade. Also, surplus coalition government affect the 
government primary negatively in the 2000s, as opposed to single minority government, 
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which implies that one type of majority coalition government typically affects the budget 
negatively as opposed to a single minority government. 
   Since the relationship between the minority dummy and expenditure did not work as 
expected, this empirical investigation demonstrates that it was justifiable to choose minority 
government as a measure of political variable as opposed to number of parties in ruling 
coalition. The level of cooperation in a minority government depends on the support of at 
least on other party in parliament, and maybe more importantly on whether this support is 
consistent in terms of the most important policy questions. The budget proposition is typically 
one of the most controversial questions where parties with different ideologies rarely agree. 
With strong support there are clear advantages with minority governments. It benefits the 
democracy by giving more power to the parliament than the government. It might also be 
more transparent given the fact that many parties are forced to communicate. With weak 
support however, there is a big risk of political fragmentation. Consequently, political 
fragmentation might vary substantially among different minority governments. This study 
shows how both revenue and expenditure is negatively affected by minority governments. To 
some extent this reflects the minority government’s ambiguous influence over the primary 
balance. 
    I believe my results have two important implications. First, minority governments cannot 
directly translate into more numbers of parties in ruling coalition and more precisely not into 
more political fragmentation. Two, if the goal is to measure political fragmentation, minority 
governments as a measure needs to be reconstructed. Particularly it seems important to 
determine the causes of why minority governments need to seek support among dissident 
parties in parliament. One suggestion is to study the party which contains balance of power in 
parliament with respect to the budget deficit.  
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